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South Korea has the most sup-ported agricultural sectoramong member countries of
the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).
Public intervention mainly consists
of high production prices supported
by government purchases, together
with high tariffs that protect domes-
tic producers from foreign competi-
tion and implicitly tax consumers.
Trade liberalization recently took
place in particular sectors, and Ko-
rea is now a major importer of oil-
seeds and coarse grains. However,
Korea only reluctantly exposed its
agricultural sector to the provisions
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA) of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). It has
kept nearly prohibitive tariffs in the
rice, meat, and dairy sectors; high
production subsidies in most other
sectors; and significant non-tariff
trade barriers on many commodi-
ties, including administrative barri-
ers (import monopolies) and
sanitary restrictions.
Exporting countries have
stressed that Korean farm policy im-
poses high food costs on consumers
and increases the cost of labor for
its manufacturing sector. By artifi-
cially maintaining resources in agri-
culture, Korean agricultural policy
allegedly slows the growth rate of
the entire domestic economy. Other
WTO member countries complain
that Korea, while benefiting from
global manufacturing export oppor-
tunities, creates considerable ob-
stacles to other countries’ exports
of food products.
In preparation for the Doha
Round of the WTO negotiations, Ko-
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rea has promoted food security ob-
jectives and has emphasized the
need to ensure an adequate supply
of food under all market conditions.
Korea defines food security as a joint
reliance on trade, domestic produc-
tion, and self-sufficiency. Despite
trade concessions under the URAA,
Korea has pursued food self-suffi-
ciency as the way to achieve food
security. Food security based on self-
sufficiency is a recurring theme
among developing-country members
of the WTO. For instance, India has
proposed similar policies. However,
self-sufficiency objectives are detri-
mental to (poor) consumers and are
inconsistent with food security as
“access to food for all” proposed by
the World Food Summit of the Food
and Agriculture Organization.
WELFARE COSTS OF KOREAN
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
Table 1 shows the producer support
estimate, a measure of domestic
subsidization expressed as a per-
centage of the value of production,
calculated by the OECD. It reaches
74 percent in Korea compared to an
OECD average of 40 percent in 1999.
The Korean government provides a
few direct payments and some input
subsidies (fertilizers and interest
subsidies), but 95 percent of subsi-
dies are transfers from consumers.
These subsidies cost consumers far
more than producers gain.
Table 2 shows that it takes 15.8
wons in lost consumer income for
every 10 wons increase in farmer
income. These high costs are attrib-
utable to policy instruments that are
coupled to production and con-
sumer taxation. High tariffs and ad-
ministrative prices reflect the
Korean government’s preference for
self-sufficiency objectives regardless
of the cost to consumers in sectors
such as rice, pork, or poultry. Rice
growers get the largest transfer, fol-
lowed by beef, pork, and milk pro-
ducers. Rice policy contributes
most to resource misallocation, fol-
lowed by beef, dairy, and pork. Beef
has the lowest efficiency of transfer,
with around 47 percent of lost con-
sumer income being gained by Ko-
rean producers.
TRADE IMPACTS OF KOREAN
AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON
TRADING PARTNERS
As a member of the WTO, Korea
had to convert quantitative restric-
tions on imports into bound tariffs,
reduce these tariffs over an imple-
mentation period, open its market
to imports under the minimum ac-
cess provisions, and reduce the
most trade-distorting forms of do-
mestic support in 1994. However,
Korea applied the Uruguay Round
provisions so that it could shelter
its producers from foreign competi-
tion in key sectors. For example,
Korea postponed the tariffication
of rice for 10 years and negotiated
an obligation to import only 4 per-
cent of its consumption by 2004. In
most staple foods, Korea also has
kept import restrictions through its
special domestic rules. Prohibitive
tariffs and administrative barriers
still restrict imports of many agri-
cultural goods to Korea. Self-suffi-
ciency remains a policy objective
(see Table 3), particularly in the
rice sector, because of the strength
of the rice producer lobby, the cul-
tural significance of this food, and
South Korea’s possible reunifica-
tion with North Korea—which has
been experiencing dramatic short-
ages of rice, making this issue par-
ticularly sensitive.
Other countries involved in the
Doha Round care more about import
and export volumes than about the
politics of any given country. Despite
the recent surge in imports of corn,
wheat, and soybeans, we estimate
that 2,273 billion won at (1995
prices; $1=1,290 won) of trading op-
portunities are foregone every year.
Self-sufficiency targets reduce de-
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mand by imposing high prices on con-
sumers, which can lead to the absurd
situation where a country insulates
itself from the vicissitudes of world
markets by making a portion of its
population go hungry. A reasonable
alternative would be to set produc-
tion levels of staple foods as targets
and rely on imports as an additional
source of food items. Low or no tariffs
on the consumer side would result in
higher demand. However, domestic
production would be maintained,
thus affording some insurance against
world market uncertainty. This policy
would result in the same “security”
for domestic supply as that offered by
self-sufficiency, without imposing
large food taxes on consumers.
Table 4 presents the trade impli-
cations of alternative approaches to
food security using historical pro-
duction levels as a target. This re-
flects a policy based on deficiency
payments and no tariffs.
A policy that sets production tar-
gets rather than self-sufficiency tar-
gets represents a more palatable
option for importing countries within
the WTO and could be implemented
with large deficiency payments. This
policy, which has been used in U.S.
farm programs for years, would mini-
mize consumer losses and generate
additional Korean imports, with a
limited loss of tariff revenue. In addi-
tion, lower food costs increase con-
sumption and result in significant
efficiency gains, sufficient to more
than pay for the farm program. Tar-
geted deficiency payments in the
staple grains sector (rice and barley)
that achieve historical production
levels, while removing tariffs on im-
ports, would reduce efficiency losses
by 72 percent (to 1,716 billion wons
at 1995 prices) and would expand
opportunities for exporters. u
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